Abstract. Peter Gärdenfors proved a theorem purporting to show that it is impossible to adjoin to the AGM-postulates for belief-revision a principle of monotonicity for revisions. The principle of monotonicity in question is implied by the Ramsey test for conditionals. So Gärdenfors' result has been interpreted as demonstrating that it is impossible to combine the Ramsey test for conditionals with the basic postulates for rational belief-revision. It is shown here that this interpretation of Gärdenfors' result is unwarranted. A new diagnosis is offered of a methodological error made in the statement of the key principle of monotonicity. Crucial applications of this principle in Gärdenfors' proof require one to regard as revisions what are really expansions. If monotonicity is stated only for genuine revisions, then Gärdenfors' proof does not go through. Nor can it; for, when the monotonicity principle for revisions is correctly formulated, one can actually establish a contrary consistency result. This requires only a slight adjustment to the postulates of AGM-theory, in order to ensure that the three operations of expansion, contraction, and revision trichotomize the domain of theorychanges. It is further shown that being careful in this way about the proper domains of definition of the three operations of expansion, contraction, and revision also disposes of another, more direct, impossibility result, due to Arló-Costa, that targets the Ramsey test. §1. Introduction. Phaedrus 265-e is the origin of the much used conversational phrase "carving X at its joints" whether X be Nature or some abstract subject-matter. In the 1995 translation by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff (Plato, 1995) , Socrates tells Phaedrus that we need . . . to be able to cut up each kind according to its species along its natural joints, and to try not to splinter any part, as a bad butcher might do.
It is shown here that on a proper conception of theory-revision the proof of Gärdenfors's theorem does not go through. In order to show this, a reanalysis is called for of the three kinds of theory-change. One needs to appreciate how certain formal steps in the proof of Gärdenfors's theorem correspond to no principle that a careful theorist of theory-change should be willing to endorse. The principles at work in Gärdenfors's proof do not explicate the correct intuitions of the theorist of theory-change who has carved the domain of theorychange at its natural joints. Those principles apply only to an incorrect conception of theory-revision.
In Tennant (2006a) it is shown that it is consistent to postulate monotonicity for theoryrevision, properly conceived. It follows that the proof of Gärdenfors's impossibility theorem cannot be adapted so as to apply to a correct conception of theory-revision. §2. Theory changes.
Terminology and notation.
Theories will be denoted by J , K, and M, and sentences by α, β, δ, γ , ϕ, ψ, and θ within the language L, which contains disjunction (∨).
, , and will be sets of sentences in L. ϕ means that ϕ is deducible from . The logical closure [ ] is the set of all L-sentences deducible from . For [ ∪{ϕ}] one can also write [ , ϕ] . The symbol ⊥ stands for absurdity.
Contraction, expansion, and revision.
Let us represent a rational agent's beliefs as a consistent theory K of sentences in some language L. Naturally, we are idealizing in so doing. For we are representing the agent's beliefs as free of any internal contradictions, and as logically closed. This closure will be by means of a logic that obeys at least the following two structural rules:
It follows from our idealization that the agent believes every logical truth and therefore disbelieves every logical falsehood. This will remain true, no matter how the agent's theory K might change. Neither logical truths nor logical falsehoods can occasion theory-change of any kind (at least for an ideal rational agent). So one cannot change any consistent theory with respect to any logical truth or logical falsehood. If a sentence ϕ of L is to be capable of triggering a genuine change in a consistent theory K (thereby yielding a different consistent theory K ), then ϕ must be contingent. The restriction to consistent theories is also important. This study does not address the problem of how to change an inconsistent theory.
We now consider the questions 'How might a contingent sentence ϕ trigger a change in a consistent theory K? What are the possible kinds of change? For each kind of change, how does ϕ have to be situated in order to occasion it? ' To answer these questions, one begins by locating where in logical space the contingent sentence ϕ lies with respect to the consistent theory K. The first thing to determine about ϕ is whether it lies within K. If ϕ lies within K, then the point of the theory-change will be to get ϕ out. But if ϕ lies outside K, then the point of the theory-change will be to get ϕ in. (For remember, K is logically closed.) Moreover, if ϕ lies outside K, the second thing to determine is whether ϕ is consistent with K.
Only three possibilities can result from these two determinations:
1. ϕ lies in K; 2. ϕ lies outside K, but is consistent with K; and 3. ϕ lies outside K, and is inconsistent with K.
The following diagram helps to clarify the situation.
The subscripts on ϕ correspond to the three possibilities just listed. The outer box represents the language L. The box labeled K is our rational agent's belief-set (or theory). K contains all logical truths (represented by the innermost box), and excludes all logical falsehoods (represented by the outermost border area). A vertical division is drawn within the space of contingent sentences, and the reader is asked to imagine that contingent sentences lying to the left of the line of division are those that are consistent with K, while those lying to the right of the line are those that are inconsistent with K. The region of contingent sentences, in between the logical truths and the logical falsehoods, is trichotomized (relative to K ) into the three connected subregions containing, respectively, ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , and ϕ 3 . The boundaries between the first and second subregions and between the second and third subregions (indicated by thicker lines), are the natural joints.
Principal-case theory.
The principal-case theorist of theory-change insists on the following three points:
1. The operation of contracting a consistent theory K should be defined only with respect to those sentences that, like ϕ 1 in the diagram, are not logically true but are implied by K. (It follows that ϕ 1 is contingent.) 2. The operation of expanding a consistent theory K should be defined only with respect to those sentences that, like ϕ 2 in the diagram, are consistent with K but not implied by K. (It follows that ϕ 2 is contingent.) 3. The operation of revising a consistent theory K should be defined only with respect to those sentences that, like ϕ 3 in the diagram, are themselves consistent, but are inconsistent with K. (It follows that ϕ 3 is contingent.)
The principal-case theorist insists that there is no common ground between any two of these operations of theory-change. Theory-changes (of consistent K with respect to contingent ϕ) are strictly trichotomized according to ϕ's three possible locations in logical space with respect to K. Those locations are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. And the theory K, to repeat, is itself consistent. How does a contingent sentence ϕ figure in each of these three kinds of theory-change described above?
1. When contracting a consistent theory K with respect to ϕ, the aim is to find a minimally mutilated, proper subtheory K of K that does not contain ϕ. Since K is consistent, obviously K is also. The SUCCESS condition is that K ϕ. 2. When expanding a consistent theory K with respect to ϕ, the aim is to add ϕ to K, and take for K the logical closure of the result. Since K is consistent with ϕ, obviously K is consistent. The SUCCESS condition is that K ϕ. 3. Finally, when revising a consistent theory K with respect to ϕ, the aim is to find a consistent theory K that contains ϕ but also contains 'as much as possible' of the old theory K as well. The SUCCESS condition is that K ϕ.
The three operations are interrelated in a well-known recipe, due to Isaac Levi, for revising a theory K with respect to ϕ: first, contract K with respect to ¬ϕ; then expand the result with respect to ϕ. Expressing this in equational form with the theory-change operations * (revision), − (contraction), and + (expansion), we obtain the
Proof. Suppose K * ϕ ψ. Any revision K * ϕ is defined only for contingent ϕ, whence ϕ ⊥. Moreover, K * ϕ is consistent, whence also ψ ⊥.
On 'contracting' or 'revising' the inconsistent theory.
It is worth emphasizing that this study does not consider the problem of how to change an inconsistent theory. According to intuitionistic (hence also classical) logic, there is in fact only one inconsistent theory in the language L, namely the whole language L itself. This is because of the rule of inference known as Ex Falso Quodlibet, which permits one to infer any sentence from ⊥ (absurdity).
If one takes a theory to be given simply as a set of sentences, there is accordingly no guidance to be had as to how to change an inconsistent theory (i.e., the theory L) to a consistent one. That is, there is no guidance as to how best to 'contract' L with respect to ⊥. (Scare quotes are used here because, in this study, contraction is defined only for consistent theories and contingent sentences in them.) Likewise, there is no guidance as to how best to 'contract' L with respect to a given contingent sentence ϕ. The maxim of minimal mutilation would presumably dictate that such a contraction would be some maximal (i.e., complete) theory in L-indeed, one that contains ¬ϕ. But which such maximal theory should one choose?-there will be, in general, continuum-many of these to choose from! It follows too that there is no satisfying answer to the question how best to 'revise' the inconsistent theory-that is, the whole language L-with respect to a given contingent sentence ϕ. Would the 'revision' L * ϕ be L back again? Or could it be no more than [ϕ] (even when the latter is not a complete theory)? Against these possibilities, the maxim of minimal mutilation would presumably dictate that such a revision would be a maximal (i.e., complete) and consistent theory in L containing ϕ. But then the problem of choosing from continuum-many theories would present itself again. Unless one is given an epistemological basis for the inconsistent theory, with respect to which the 'source' of the inconsistency can be tracked down and expunged, there is really no obvious answer to this question. 1 Fortunately, by focusing on the normative requirements of a theory of belief-revision on the part of logical saints, we can sidestep this vexing question altogether, and refrain from trying to answer it. Logical saints will never be convicted of inconsistency. So L will never be a candidate for saintly revision. That is not to say, however, that a logical saint with consistent belief-set K will never be in a position where she wishes to adopt a (contingent) belief ϕ that conflicts with K. On the contrary!-that is the principal case, which is all that the normative theory of theory-revision is required to handle.
There is really no theoretical loss at all in not taking a stand on how best to 'revise' an inconsistent theory, even if only with respect to a contingent sentence.
Monotonicity principles.
Apart from the Levi Identity, which involves all three operations of theory-change, we can inquire whether there are any substantive principles concerning each operation taken on its own. Monotonicity principles would appear to be good candidates here. It is quite clear, for example, that expansion is a monotonic operation (since the logic obeys DILUTION):
The correspondingly simple formulations of the monotonicity of contraction 2 and of revision also seem intuitively compelling:
Remember, K and M are to be understood as consistent theories, as are their revisions (K * ϕ) and (M * ϕ).
In this paper, the focus is on the monotonicity of revision. So, henceforth, by 'monotonicity' we shall mean monotonicity of revision. It turns out that for the purposes of the present discussion we do not need an analysis or explication of the notion of minimal mutilation. It is orthogonal to our concerns, which have to do with the relationship between revisions and certain conditionals. The next section is devoted to the conditionals in question. §3. Counterdoxastic conditionals. Let ϕ be a contingent claim. Suppose a rational agent disbelieves ϕ. It does not matter whether ϕ is true; all that matters is that the 1 For an account of theory-revision on a different conception of 'theory', see Tennant (2003) .
If belief-systems are treated as finite dependency networks, then there is a satisfying way of accounting for how to restore consistency to an inconsistent belief-system. The present study, however, is constrained by AGM-theory's choice of logically closed theories as the theoretical representation of a belief-system. The constraint is observed so that a critique can be mounted of a faulty argument that can be faulted even on AGM-theory's own terms. 2 The argument in (Fuhrmann, 1997, p. 21) against the monotonicity of contraction is based on the same kind of category mistake as this study is concerned to reveal at work in arguments against monotonicity of revision that are based on Gärdenfors's impossibility proof. One hesitates to call such conditionals counterfactuals, since, as already stressed, the agent might disbelieve ϕ even though ϕ is true. The important thing about a conditional of the form ϕ •→ ψ is that the agent who believes it disbelieves its antecedent ϕ. So a good term for such a conditional would be 'counterdoxastic'. 3 If a counterdoxastic conditional behaved like a truth-functional (or even:intuitionistic) conditional, then the agent's disbelief in ϕ would commit her to belief in both 'If ϕ then ψ' and 'If ϕ then not-ψ'. But this is seldom the case. Usually, the agent will have a strong preference for, say, 'If ϕ then ψ' over its conflicting companion 'If ϕ, then not-ψ'. How is one to make sense of such preferences for one counterdoxastic conditional over its conflicting companion? Certainly, a first step is to deny that the conditional locution 'If . . . then . . . ' involved in counterdoxastic conditionals is anything like the conditional of intuitionistic propositional logic or of classical propositional logic. But where does the theorist go from there? §4. Ramsey's proposal. Ramsey once wrote, in an important footnote (Ramsey, 1931, p. 247 , fn. 1), If two people are arguing 'If p will q?' and are both in doubt as to p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about q; so that in a sense 'If p, q' and 'If p, q' are contradictories.
Belief-revision theorists in the AGM tradition have reinterpreted Ramsey's dictum more formally as the so-called 'Ramsey test'. The test is this: the agent's belief-set K entails (ϕ •→ψ) just in case ψ is entailed by the agent's preferred revision (K * ϕ) (of her former belief-set K with respect to the newly adopted belief ϕ). The revision (K * ϕ) is understood as the belief-set that results from the agent's minimally mutilating K, by surrendering not-ϕ-and ensuring that what remains of K does not imply not-ϕ-and then consistently adopting ϕ. The agent will have her revision function *, so to speak, and it will be wedded to her counterdoxastic conditionalizing thus:
We can rewrite this in the form of an Introduction rule for •→, and a corresponding elimination rule:
Remember that the discussion here is of a rational agent, who can be thought of as a logical saint. There is therefore no theoretical shortfall in confining the Ramsey test, as here explicated in formal notation, to consistent theories K and to contingent sentences ϕ-indeed, to contingent sentences ϕ that are inconsistent with K, so that the revision K * ϕ will be defined. All this is quite a lot, formally, to squeeze from Ramsey's footnote. Ramsey himself did not have a systematic conception of belief-revision, let alone of belief-revision functions in the AGM sense. So when he writes of 'adding p hypothetically' to one's stock of knowledge, one is inclined to view this simply as a consistent extension of what one already knows. 4 Indeed, his footnote continued:
If either party believes p for certain, the question ['If p will q?'] ceases to mean anything to him except as a question about what follows from certain laws or hypotheses.
But even when the party disbelieves p, the original question ['If p will q?'] would be an interesting one. For it invites the subjunctive reading: 'If p were the case, would q (nevertheless/still) be the case)?' That is why the so-called Ramsey test now tells us how a rational agent's commitment to certain counterdoxastic conditionals relates to her commitment to revise her beliefs in certain ways.
Indeed, it is the counterdoxastic case which has to be the more interesting one, theoretically. For consider the other cases. If a party believes p, then there is a straightforward answer to the question 'If p, will q?': simply check whether the party believes q. On the other hand, if the party has no opinion on the question whether p, then then there is still a pretty straightforward answer to the question 'If p, will q?': check whether q follows upon assuming p hypothetically alongside the party's remaining beliefs. By contrast, the counterdoxastic case is the one that presents a challenge. Here, the hypothetical addition of p to one's current beliefs will involve making some accommodations and adjustments to the latter; which is why the Ramsey test speaks of revisions. §5. The supposed problem. Peter Gärdenfors, however, proved a theorem (see Gärdenfors, 1986, pp. 85-86) which has been widely accepted as demonstrating that it is impossible to marry the Ramsey test (R) for counterdoxastic conditionals to certain basic postulates for rational belief-revision. As Sven Ove Hansson wrote six years later (see Hansson, 1992 , p. 522), Gärdenfors . . . has caused considerable commotion in the belief dynamics community by proving that the Ramsey test is incompatible with what seem to be weak and reasonable demands on a system of belief revision.
It is shown here that this interpretation of Gärdenfors' result is unwarranted. Whatever is established by Gärdenfors' result, it is not that such a marriage is impossible. Indeed, there is no obstacle at all to such a marriage; for one can actually establish a contrary consistency result. (See Tennant, 2006a , for details.) Note that a consistency result does not imply any claim to the effect that the combination of monotonicity of revision and the Ramsey test is ever, or often, or always plausible in the modeling of rational agents' belief-changes. All that is being claimed here is that Gärdenfors' result does not demonstrate the inconsistency of that combination.
Establishing the contrary consistency result just mentioned requires a fresh statement of the AGM-postulates for rational belief-revision. This involves the friendliest of amendments to AGM-theory. In Tennant (2006a) it is shown that those postulates can be re-stated within the AGM-framework in such a way that the operations of expansion, contraction, and revision trichotomize the domain of theory-changes in the manner explained above. Given the new postulates for the properly restricted operations, rational belief-revision functions can satisfy a suitably expressed Ramsey test (see (R † ) below). That is because revisions will be defined only where they really are revisions, not expansions. §6. Trying to locate the source of the problem. As Hansson points out (loc. cit.), various authors have sought to abandon or to weaken certain assumptions used in Gärdenfors' impossibility proof; or they have shown that the proof survives certain weakenings of chosen assumptions. Neither Hansson nor any of the authors whom he cites, however, has raised against Gärdenfors' proof the objection that will be developed here. The fault does not lie where any of these other authors has been looking. The problem is not that a particular logic, such as classical logic, has been chosen for closure of belief sets. Nor is the problem that logically closed theories are being used as idealizations of the beliefsets of rational agents. Nor is the problem that incorporated into such sets are beliefs of counterdoxastically conditional form. Nor is the problem that expansions of belief-sets that contain counterdoxastic conditionals cannot be logically closed.
Instead, one can identify the underlying problem via a careful logical analysis of the proof of the impossibility theorem. A diagnosis will be offered below of exactly where, intuitively, Gärdenfors' proof offends against clear and distinct pre-formal intuitions concerning rational belief-change.
The deep reason why Gärdenfors' differing statement of his original postulates allowed him to obtain his purported impossibility theorem is that he made essential use of extremal cases of revision. These are cases of belief 'revision' in name only-for they are really expansions of the agent's belief-set. And they distract the theorist's attention from the principal cases that really matter. Gärdenfors allows revision operations to trespass upon territory that should be the exclusive domain of the operation of expansion.
The purpose of the restatement of the AGM-postulates for rational belief-revision (in Tennant, 2006a) is to avoid Gärdenfors' extremal cases altogether, and to concentrate only on principal cases of expansion, contraction, and revision. This way one can effect a thoroughgoing division of labor among the three operations of belief-change. By eschewing extremal cases, and hewing to principal cases only, one can provide postulates for rational belief-revision that not only are not subject to Gärdenfors' impossibility proof, but also allow one to show that the postulates for rational belief-revision are consistent with the Principle of Monotonicity of Revisions. This clears the way for productive lines of research within a theoretical framework affording both this principle and the Ramsey test, which implies it. By eschewing extremal cases one obtains some much needed tightening of an otherwise rather lax set of postulates for belief-revision. §7. The principles employed in Gärdenfors' proof. One makes convenient use of the following logical properties of ∨ and of the deducibility relation in proving Gärdenfors's theorem:
The following steps are easily derivable, and will carry the label LOGIC in their applications below:
Since theories are logically closed, one can prove that one theory [ ] is included in another theory [ ] by means of the following rule:
Some steps will register the transitivity of the inclusion relation among sets:
AGM-theory treats of operations * of revision, which map any theory K and sentence α to the 'revised' theory K * α. Use will be made of the following inferences that are peculiar to the AGM-theory of theory-revision, and which are used in the Gärdenfors impossibility proof:
CONSISTENCY says that revision with respect to a consistent sentence yields a consistent result.
The Gärdenfors impossibility proof uses in addition the following principle:
The lesson of the impossibility proof is supposed to be that it is MONOTONICITY that is problematic. MONOTONICITY cannot be added to the AGM-theory already involving both the principles PRESERVATION and SUCCESS for revisions. Yet MONOTONICITY is an easy consequence of the Ramsey test:
Proof.
In order to establish his impossibility theorem, Gärdenfors assumes that the language L contains a theory K and three sentences α, β, and δ, each consistent with K (whence K is consistent) but pairwise inconsistent. This yields the following six NON-TRIVIALITY assumptions:
In order to appreciate just how innocuous these assumptions are, let K be a consistent theory that implies no informative claim about the color of this ball; and let α, β, and δ be the claims that the ball is red, that the ball is blue, and that the ball is green. It would be consistent with K to adopt any one of these claims about the ball's color; but each pair of such claims is inconsistent. NON-TRIVIALITY, though involved as an assumption in the proof of Gärdenfors' impossibility theorem, surely cannot be a candidate for rejection. It is important to stress that no objection is being raised to the NON-TRIVIALITY assumptions. §8. Gärdenfors' proof, as a natural deduction. Let us turn now to the formalization of Gärdenfors' proof of his impossibility theorem. The reader skeptical as to whether what follows is indeed 'the' proof of the Gärdenfors Impossibility Theorem should be reassured that this formalization was arrived at by translating into natural deduction Hansson's more informal proof at p. 365 of Hansson (1999) . Each primitive step in Hansson's proof is an application of one of the rules stated above. The reader will find supplied in full the working for both the cases in an important proof by cases, in which Hansson (following Gärdenfors) had concentrated on just one case, 'without loss of generality'. After all the deductive details had been filled in, the resulting natural deduction was normalized and constructivized. It is now presented in manageable pieces of natural deduction that can be grafted one upon another as indicated. In order to contain sideways spread of proofs on the page, some abbreviations are needed for labels of inferences. They will be as follows:
Full name
Abbreviation
The proof-work begins by forming chunks of proof in which β enjoys certain crucial occurrences. (Remember that α, β, and δ are taken to be three specific sentences that satisfy NON-TRIVIALITY.) β :
Next one can form β :
One can now repeat the foregoing proof-work, but with superscripts δ in place of β. The thoroughgoing homology between the β-version and the δ-version explains why, in the informal mathematical reasoning being formalized here, one gives only the foregoing argument(s) (the β-version) and ignores their homologues (the δ-version) 'without loss of generality' (for a proof by cases).
Next one can form δ :
Now that we are equipped with the foregoing proofs β and its homologue δ , it remains only to chase down a contradiction by accumulating the following pieces of formal proof.
(K * α) * (β ∨δ) ⊥ (β ∨δ) ⊥ CON ⊥ §9. When is a revision really a revision? In the formal proof just given, crucial occurrences of * are rooted in applications of PRESERVATION, a principle that has gone unremarked, to date, in published reactions to Gärdenfors' proof. But what this principle says:
is that if ϕ is consistent with K, then the 'revision' K * ϕ includes K.
No commentator seems to have been moved to lodge the obvious objection that, if ϕ is consistent with K, then there really is no such thing, intuitively, as the revision of K with respect to ϕ. For nothing in K would need to be given up upon undertaking a commitment to ϕ. Rather, given the premise of the statement of PRESERVATION-that K, ϕ ⊥-the operation-sign * (at its aforementioned crucial occurrences) should really be the operation-sign + for expansion. For what we are doing, intuitively, is expanding, not revising. 7 Likewise in the context of the statement of MONOTONICITY. Substituting * for + in the statement of PRESERVATION produces the trivial inference
which is obviously unobjectionable. When one thus substitutes + for *, in order to respect the division of labor among the three operations of expansion, contraction, and revision, the would-be applications of MONOTONICITY in β and δ become, respectively, the questionable steps
But these have nothing to do with MONOTONICITY of genuine revisions. This is for the respective reasons that
is consistent with β ∨ δ, so that it is not possible genuinely to revise [K, α∨β] with respect to β ∨δ; and, likewise, 2. [K, α ∨ δ] is consistent with β ∨ δ, so that it is not possible genuinely to revise [K, α∨δ] with respect to β ∨δ.
The operations of theory-change being effected on [K, α ∨ β] with respect to β ∨ δ, and on [K, α ∨ δ] with respect to β ∨ δ, are really expansions. To be sure, the asterisk * in (K + α) * (β ∨δ)-the conclusion of -is warranted (as sortally correct), since (K + α) is inconsistent with (β ∨δ). But that is too little, too late. One cannot rescue the formal correctness of the two steps just questioned as applications of the principle of MONOTONICITY of revisions. For, in the formal statement of that principle:
one can require, as a precondition, that the consistent theory K be inconsistent with ϕ (whence also M will be inconsistent with ϕ). Only if this precondition is met is one dealing with MONOTONICITY of revisions. The principle should therefore be stated as follows:
It is also entirely in keeping with the spirit of the Ramsey test:
that one should insist on its validity only in the challenging case where the antecedent ϕ of the conditional is itself consistent, but it inconsistent with the (consistent) belief-set K that is to be revised. One can also confine one's interest to consistent consequents ψ. So the Ramsey test, without loss of power or interest, can be modified as follows:
Or, expressed in rule form: 8
This modified Ramsey test represents a properly cautious logical regimentation of what belief-revision theorists have sought to draw from Ramsey's original proposal, rather than a genuine weakening. It is quite clear from Ramsey's original text that he was prepared to contemplate assertibility conditions for conditionals whose antecedents were disbelieved. And it was argued above that this was the most interesting case for the theorist. Hence the precondition 'if K, ϕ ⊥' is warranted (in (R † )) by way of explication of what beliefrevision theorists wish to draw from Ramsey's original proposal. The same precondition is also effective in disposing of Gärdenfors' proof, by showing that proof to be irrelevant to revision properly construed.
Note also that Lemma 7.1 survives the imposition of the new restrictions on the Ramsey test and the monotonicity principle:
Proof. The labels •→-I † and •→-E † will be abbreviated to I † and E † respectively. The two unlabeled steps below are applications of Lemma 2.1.
It remains only to observe that Gärdenfors' impossibility theorem, despite Lemma 9.1, does not show that (R † ) cannot hold. Indeed, in Tennant (2006a) a theorem is proved to the effect that there are revisions functions satisfying both the basic AGM-postulates for revision (properly reformulated) and the Principle of Monotonicity for Revisions (properly restricted to the case where K , ϕ ⊥).
In the relational reformulation proposed in the same paper, it is made quite explicit that revisions are not, in general, unique. The relational locution ↑ (J, K , A) is introduced, to mean 'J is a revision of K by switching to A'. Accordingly, the Ramsey test would have to be reformulated in the relational setting as follows:
. §10. On Arló-Costa's impossibility proof. There is in the literature an even more direct proof purporting to establish the impossibility of combining the Ramsey test with minimal plausible postulates governing theory-revision. It is in Arló-Costa (1990, pp. 560-561) .
Arló-Costa first derives what he calls the 'Unsuccess' result (p. 560). Unsuccess is the claim that if K is inconsistent, then K = K * ϕ, no matter what sentence ϕ is used for the attempted revision. Then, using Unsuccess as a lemma, Arló-Costa chooses a special instance-where the theory K to be revised is the whole language-in order to derive a contradiction. The latter derivation invokes a principle that Arló-Costa calls Success. This states that the revision of any theory with respect to a consistent sentence is consistent. The only other assumptions used in the proof of the impossibility result are that the True does not logically imply the False; and that contradictions logically imply any sentence whatsoever (including sentences involving the conditional operator •→).
One can shorten Arló-Costa's proof by formalizing it and normalizing it, thereby laying bare exactly where the underlying pathology is located. Stated here on Arló-Costa's behalf is a minimal set of principles that suffice to generate his impossibility result. There are four of them.
First, we have Ex Falso Quodlibet (EFQ). As a basic rule of inference in intuitionistic (hence in classical) natural deduction, EFQ is stated as ⊥ ϕ Thus stated, EFQ is an inference rule in the logic of the object-language. For ease of use here, however, EFQ will be stated as the metalogical axiom-schema
where it is to be understood that ϕ can be replaced by any sentence whatsoever when instantiating this axiom-schema.
Secondly, we have the Consistency of logic (CONS), stating that the logical truth does not imply the logical falsehood ⊥: ⊥ ⊥ CONS Note that in this rule, the conclusion ⊥ is the absurdity symbol of the metalogic, while the occurrence of ⊥ in the premise is the absurdity symbol of the logic of the object-language.
Thirdly, we have the Ramsey test, in one direction only, in the form of the rule that we have called •→-Elimination:
Finally, we have the principle that Arló-Costa calls Success (and which we shall accordingly label SUCCESS AC ), stating that the revision of any theory K with respect to a consistent sentence ϕ is consistent. Equivalently, by way of contraposition, one could say that if a revision K * ϕ is inconsistent, then ϕ is inconsistent:
Arló-Costa's impossibility result can now take the form of the following very short reductio of the principles EFQ, •→-ELIM, SUCCESS AC , and CONS:
What can the proponent of the present approach say in response to (this version of) Arló-Costa's impossibility proof? Note that 1. the axiom-scheme EFQ was applied using the 'Ramsey-conditional' sentence
•→ ⊥ as an instance of the placeholder ϕ; 2. the rule •→-ELIM was instantiated with respect to the inconsistent theory [⊥] and with respect to the logically true sentential constant in place of ϕ; and 3. the rule SUCCESS AC , likewise, was applied with the inconsistent theory [⊥] as an instance of K and with the logically true sentential constant in place of ϕ.
There is no intention here to raise objections to (1) above. No stand is taken here on the issue of whether 'Ramsey conditionals' (i.e., what have here been called 'counterdoxastic' conditionals) may be construed as truth-bearers, and as eligible to be members of beliefsets. Our whole discussion has been orthogonal to, and independent of, that issue, even though it is one on which belief-revision theorists have been divided. It would appear, however, that no version of the short Arló-Costa reductio can be forthcoming if one prohibits the rule-instances described in (2) and (3) above. Exactly such prohibitions are called for on the present approach. On this approach, the revision K * ϕ of a theory K with respect to a sentence ϕ is defined only when the theory K is consistent and the sentence ϕ is both contingent and inconsistent with K. These preconditions are manifestly not met in the case at hand: [⊥] is an inconsistent theory, and the sentential constant ⊥ is logically true, hence not contingent. Furthermore, the step labeled •→-ELIM in the proof above is one half of a naïve Ramsey test that omits the precondition that the consequent of the counterdoxastic conditional be consistent. Here, ⊥ is the consequent of the counterdoxastic conditional in question, so that precondition (of the revised, non-naïve Ramsey test) would not be fulfilled.
Arló-Costa's result Unsuccess can be derived from the (naïve) Ramsey test when, but only when, the latter is framed so generally as to allow the consideration of inconsistent belief-sets K. The same is true of the impossibility result that Arló-Costa obtains via Unsuccess. Moreover, in the application that Arló-Costa makes of Unsuccess in his subsequent reasoning, he needs to have the logically true sentential constant featuring as the sentence with respect to which revision is taking place.
It is worth reminding the reader yet again that the treatment of revision that has been proposed here is restricted to consistent belief-sets K that are to undergo revision. Moreover, the sentences with respect to which revision takes place are themselves to be contingent, and inconsistent with the theory that is to be revised. These precautions flow from what was called principal-case analysis above. That analysis dictates a new and scrupulously careful approach to the 'extremal' cases that are crucially involved in the course of Gärdenfors's impossibility proof, and in the more direct impossibility proof of Arló-Costa. The assimilation of these extremal cases to principal cases has tended to obstruct our understanding of the true nature of ideal theory-revision in the clear, central, and paradigmatic case where a consistent theory is to be revised with respect to a contingent sentence with which it conflicts. §11. Five Objections and Replies. This dialectical section ought to serve to clarify the exact nature of the emendations to AGM-theory that are being proposed by the principal-case theorist. 9 Objection 1. Apparently you propose to modify PRESERVATION to:
The role of this modified postulate in your theory is unclear. (P ) seems to hold true just in virtue of the definition of '+'. It appears to be impossible to formulate a theory that violates PRESERVATION. Reply to Objection 1. The AGM principle of PRESERVATION concerns revisions:
For the principal-case theorist, if ϕ is consistent with K, then K * ϕ is not defined. That is, 'K * ϕ' is a non-denoting term. So the AGM statement of PRESERVATION is unacceptable for revisions, properly explicated. Of course, we agree with the objector that (P ) is true in virtue of the definition of '+'. As for the possibility or impossibility of formulating a theory that violates PRESERVATION, one has to examine the various forms of preservation that are potentially available to the principal-case theorist. (Remember, we are considering here only the three operations of expansion, contraction, and revision.) PRESERVATION for an operator @ is (on our manner of presentation) a rule of inference that employs as its premise a consistency claim-that K, ϕ ⊥-and has as its conclusion an inclusion claim of the form K ⊆ K @ϕ:
Given the premise of this inference, considerations of sortal correctness leave (for the principal-case theorist) only expansion (+) and contraction (−) as possible substituends for @. With + in place of @, we obtain an obviously valid inference. But with − in place of @, we obtain an obviously invalid one. Summarizing, one can say: for the principal-case theorist, Preservation makes no sense for revision, clearly fails for contraction, and is trivially acceptable for expansion.
Objection 2. If one takes seriously the principal-case theorist's proposed account of revision then it seems impossible to understand change operators @ such as David Lewis's 'imaging' (see Lewis, 1976) or Katsuno and Mendelzon's 'update' (see Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991) . In this case the original AGM postulate of Preservation is violated, and one can have the situation where a sentence ϕ consistent with a (consistent) theory K produces a change K @ϕ that is not determined as an expansion.
Reply to Objection 2. Nothing in our account rules out consideration of operators like imaging. The principal-case theorist is concerned only to achieve a correct understanding of the division of labor among the original three operations of expansion, contraction, and revision, when these are correctly explicated. And one can arrive at the correct picture while these happen to be the only three operators under consideration. It does not follow from the account laid out above that expansion is the only operation that can be performed on (K, ϕ) when K is consistent with ϕ. If one wishes to introduce an operation, such as imaging, whose domain overlaps that of an existing operation such as expansion, then the way to do so is to lay down postulates governing the new operation that will distinguish it from the other operations already characterized. 10 If the original AGM postulate of Preservation happens to be violated by the new operation, so be it. That will be one of the ways in which the new operator distinguishes itself from expansion! Extension of the present account to deal with operators other than expansion, contraction, and revision is, regrettably, not within the scope of the present paper. This paper is best read as an overdue corrective to the situation immediately following the seminal paper (Alchourrón et al., 1985) of AGM-theory, and the putative proof in Gärdenfors (1986) , one year later, that revision cannot be monotonic. On the present account, one is not concerned to deal (yet) either with operations (such as Katsuno and Mendelzon's 'update') from the later belief-revision literature, or with representations of belief that involve probabilities, as is the case in Lewis's account of conditionals.
Objection 3. There appears to be no room for a principal-case theorist to consider theory-changes that are not expansions of a (consistent) theory K for inputs that are consistent with K.
Reply to Objection 3. Au contraire; see the Reply to Objection 2. The principal-case theorist is insisting only that, in so far as the three original operations of expansion, contraction, and revision are concerned, some theorists' thought has been wanting in clarity and precision because of the way it has not heeded how those three operations trichotomize logical space. Their domains of application are pairwise disjoint. But it does not follow that one is prevented from considering, defining, and employing other new operations with inputs (K, ϕ). The proponent of such an operation would have to clarify its domain in relation to the domains of expansion, contraction, and revision, and would have to argue 10 Of course, that is not the way the proponents of update themselves proceeded. Rather, they appealed to quite sophisticated intuitions about possible worlds and the closeness relation among them, in order to explain how update is supposed to differ from both revision and expansion. See Katsuno & Mendelzon (1991) and Grahne (1991) . The expression 'supposed to' is used here to indicate that the present author would be critical of update-theorists' conception of what is being reevaluated when registering changes in the world (as opposed to changes in our knowledge of it). It would appear that they underestimate the importance of distinguishing among different dated reports, and they do not avail themselves of simple devices (such as using a temporal argument) so as to be able to regiment claims about objects' positions in the world as time-dependent. But that is a topic for another paper.
that the new formal operation explicates a useful informal operation of which we have an intuitive, pretheoretic grasp.
Objection 4. Gärdenfors's version of the Ramsey test (which features in your account) was proposed in order to provide an epistemic model of Lewis's conditional logic VC. Arló-Costa & Levi (1996) showed that the notion of change needed for this task in exactly Katsuno and Mendelzon's update (a qualitative version of imaging). This notion of change obeys Gärdenfors's version of monotonicity, not the weakened version you propose, as well as Arló-Costa's postulate called Unsuccess. These properties are essential in order to understand what imaging (update) is. It is difficult to see how you can possibly accommodate any of this.
Reply to Objection 4. Well, '[t]his notion of change', in so far as it obeys a version of monotonicity that the operation of revision should not be thought to obey, is thereby distinguished from the operation of revision (when the latter is properly explicated)! The theorist is free to consider, define, and employ any formal theory-change operation that is fruitful, precisely characterized, and that explicates a useful informal operation of which we have an intuitive, pretheoretic grasp. Presumably such an operation will be postulationally characterized, and its relation to the original three operations of expansion, contraction, and revision (properly understood!) will be able to be made clear. It might even turn out that the new operation can somehow be defined in terms of the principal-case theorists's +, −, and * ; but that possibility can be left to its proponents to explore.
Objection 5. The version of AGM defined by the principal-case theorist is a weakened version of AGM that has little to do with the original theory.
Reply to Objection 5. For all the reasons explained above, it is not a weakened form, but a corrected and improved form. The corrections have been called for in order better to align the formal operations +, −, and * with their informal or pre-formal counterparts. Indeed, on the improved understanding thereby obtained, the possibility is now opened up that one may link conditionals with the revision-operator in a Ramseyan fashion. See the relational reformulation of AGM in Tennant (2006a) for further details. But see also Tennant (2006b) (theorems 4 and 5, pp. 671 and 673) for a theorem showing how surprisingly lax the AGM postulates (including the so-called 'supplementary postulates') turn out to be. The postulates allow for revision-functions as bizarre as one wishes, in the sense that they can involve both unwanted mutilation and unwanted 'bloating' of the theories being revised. So we really have nothing much in the way of a constraining theory of theory-change, on the basis of those postulates. Unless and until AGM-theory is furnished with a more fruitful set of postulates governing expansion, contraction, and revision, there should be no complaints about any alleged weaknesses on the part of friendly amendments to their own theory. §12. Summary and conclusions. It has been shown that Gärdenfors' Impossibility Theorem establishes the impossibility of monotonicity of 'revision' only when 'revision' is construed loosely enough to include, in certain cases, expansions. The monotonicity principle that serves as an assumption for his reductio ad absurdum is therefore too strong. It can and should be weakened, so as to claim monotonicity only of genuine revisions. These are revisions with respect to sentences that are inconsistent with the theory that is being revised. The weakened monotonicity principle that incorporates this restriction follows from the correspondingly weakened Ramsey test. But the weakened monotonicity principle will no longer allow Gärdenfors' reductio ad absurdum to go through. This is because, as can be seen from the formal analysis of Gärdenfors' proof, he needs to be able to apply the monotonicity principle in a context where, ex hypothesi, the restriction proposed here is violated. Moreover, no repair of his impossibility proof can be in the offing, to take care of the reformulated principle of monotonicity (M † ). This is because, pace Gärdenfors, one can actually demonstrate the existence of AGM-revision functions satisfying (M † ).
It has likewise been shown that the impossibility proof of Arló-Costa, targeting the Ramsey test, would be formally correct only when 'revision' is construed loosely enough to include the triply 'extremal' case where 1. the theory being revised is inconsistent; 2. the sentence with respect to which it is being revised is logically true; and 3. the consequent of the counterdoxastic conditional in the Ramsey test (in its 'elimination half') is inconsistent.
The present treatment renders this proof formally incorrect by laying down the precautionary preconditions of a principal-case analysis, which attends to the proper domains of definition of the three operations of expansion, contraction, and revision. The results conflict with (1)- (3) respectively, in that 1 . only consistent theories can be revised in the light of new information; 11 2 . the new information must itself be contingent, and must conflict with the old theory-otherwise, one is not revising that theory, but expanding it.
Finally, 3 . the counterdoxastic conditional in the Ramsey test should have a consistent consequent.
It would therefore appear that there is no logical objection to proposing a suitably modified but still powerful Ramsey test for conditionals as an extension of the theory of beliefrevision-once the operations of theory-change have been 'carved at their natural joints'. The belief revision community, after suffering what was perhaps unnecessary commotion, might find this a welcome prospect. §13. Acknowledgments. The most recent ancestor of this paper was presented to the Princeton Philosophy Colloquium in April 2005. The author is grateful for helpful comments from the audience. Thanks are owed also to Horacio Arló-Costa, Julian Cole, Sven Ove Hansson, Diana Raffman, Hans Rott, and George Schumm for helpful correspondence.
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